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Lost and Found 
Sabiou M. Inoua and Vernon L. Smith1 
Chapman University 
   
The Indeterminacy of Neoclassical Value Theory 
At mid-twentieth century, the neoclassical mathematical theory of value culminated in Arrow 
and Debreu’s (1954) model, which characterizes the static general equilibrium state of an 
economy. However, this description is unsatisfactory unless markets converge to such an 
equilibrium. That the Arrow-Debreu model could not accomplish this is an implication of the 
important result by Sonnenschein, Mantel, and Debreu, also known as the SMD Theorem (1972, 
1973a, 1973b; 1974; 1974).2 The heart of the problem is that the principle of individual utility 
maximization has no interesting implication for aggregate market demand, not even the law of 
demand; in fact, demand is essentially arbitrary in this theory. But this aggregation problem is 
often, if unintentionally, evaded through the artifice of the Representative Agent (Arrow, 1986; 
                                    
1 This paper is part of the authors’ larger in-process research and book manuscript on “a rehabilitation of classical 
economics.” The centerpiece is a modern mathematical restatement of the classical theory of value, based directly 
on the original observational foundations contained in Adam Smith’s ([1776] 1904) contribution, and inadvertently 
rediscovered in the literature of experimental economics.  Necessarily, the program requires an examination of 
neoclassical marginal utility economics and its separation from the classical tradition in the French and English 
followers of Smith.  (Inoua and Smith, 2019; Smith and Inoua, 2019) 
2 For reviews of the SMD Theorem, see Kirman (1989), Shafer and Sonnenschein (1993), and Rizvi (2006).            
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Kirman, 1992). Yet the problem is endemic, leading Frank Hahn (1982) to suggest that “we shall 
have to conclude that we still lack a satisfactory descriptive theory of the invisible hand” (746). 
Going further, F. M. Fisher (2013) concludes that “we do not have an adequate theory of value, 
and there is an important lacuna in the center of microeconomic theory. Yet economists 
generally behave as though this problem did not exist.” (35)                                                
We want to record the observation that acting as if a “problem does not exist” is not unique to 
economics or any science, for generally: “Scientists…do not abandon a theory merely because 
facts contradict it…they direct their attention to other problems.” (Lakatos, 1978, 4)   
We argue that neoclassical value theory suffers from a more basic and serious logical 
indeterminacy, which is inherent in the axiom of price-taking behavior, and which renders price 
dynamics indeterminate before inquiring as to its stability. If everyone in the economy takes 
price as given, whence come these prices? Who is giving these prices? Jevons avoided the 
indeterminacy by assuming that people must have complete information on supply and 
demand, and the consequent equilibrium prices—‘perfect competition.’ Walras in effect 
imported an external agent who found the prices by trial-and-error-correction (the Walrasian 
Auctioneer). Paradoxically, both approaches had the potential better to serve central planning, 
than a market economy. A theory based on price taking agents required some agency for giving 
prices. Indeed, the fit with socialism was rigorously established by influential neoclassical 
authors starting from Wieser (1893, ch. VI) and Pareto (1897, 364-371; 1909, 362-364), and, 
more formally during the Socialist Calculation Debate, by Barone ([1908] 1935), Lerner (1934), 
and Lange (1936, 1937). The paradox is hidden in the idea of ‘perfect competition’ a passive 
treatment of individuals who are not even interacting, let alone interacting in a rivalrous 
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manner. ‘Perfect competition’ is the negation of any real competition, as Hayek (1948) 
emphasized.         
 
Experimental Market Economics                
While theoretical economics failed to provide a satisfactory account of the market mechanism, 
experimental economics, beginning mid-20th century established the remarkable stability, 
efficiency, and robustness of the market process under ordinary trading rules (notably the 
double auction institution, that existed apart from the economics literature) and under realistic 
market conditions (Smith, 1962; Plott, 1982; Smith, 1982; Davis and Holt, 1993).3 These findings 
could not have been further from the expectations of the early neoclassic-trained 
experimentalists; their first struggle was with the failure to confirm widely shared expectations 
based on Jevons-Walras utility theory. Laboratory markets typically involve but a few buyers 
and few sellers, who know only their personal values and costs, or reservation prices, and who 
are obviously making the prices through their bids and asks. According to the neoclassical 
theory, we should expect only ‘market failures’ in this context. Yet the experimental markets 
                                    
3 The experiments—necessarily required to be very explicit about the instructional rules governing the exchange 
process—motivated new theoretical explorations; one recent example stemming directly from experimental 
findings is Anufriev, et al. (2011). Their “closed book, limited information” version of the theory, we suggest, most 
evidently to Adam Smith’s ([1776] 1904, Chapter VII) informal conception of information exchange and response in 
a market. Their induced reservation price framework follows classical economics, as did the early experiments.           
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generally converge to maximum efficiency. We argue that these experimental findings are in 
reality a corroboration of the classical view of the market mechanism (Inoua and Smith, 2019; 
Smith and Inoua, 2019). In fact wherever we examine an account of market price formation in 
the neoclassical literature itself, the authors invoke the old view; for example, Marshall [1890] 
1920, bk. V, ch. 2) and the Austrian marginalists, all articulated explicitly a price discovery 
process through collective ‘higgling and bargaining’ in essentially the same way that the 
classical economists explained it. The modern introductory textbook, in describing equilibrium 
tendencies, also appeals to the outbidding and underselling of buyers and sellers in 
disequilibrium.            
 
Rediscovering Classical Economics       
The neoclassical school replaced the classical one; yet its root deficiencies are direct 
consequences of its departure from the older paradigm. First, concerning method. The classical 
economists, notably Adam Smith, observed carefully the market economy, and derived from 
the acute observations a theory of markets. Thus, Smith and his followers observe the 
experience of market participants, and discover the sophisticated, unintended, collective 
regularities that emerge from myopic, self-interested, individual behaviors and interactions, 
finding that it is the cause of specialization—the famous “invisible hand” metaphor, referring to 
agents’ lack of awareness of what they have wrought. In place of this process, the neoclassical 
school in effect substituted thought experiments about an imaginary economy whose 
regularities rest entirely on artificially sophisticated individual rationality, and, epitomized by 
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one idealized person (Robinson Crusoe, Walrasian Auctioneer, Representative Agent, Social 
Planner), and evoking a command economy.                         
The Classical View on Demand and Supply 
Before the marginal revolution, the primitive concept in the theory of value was an individual’s 
valuation of a good; i.e., value in use, which means the value that a person attaches to a good 
in view of the good’s personal usefulness, as measured by the amount that this person is willing 
to pay (give up) in exchange for the good. Demand from Adam Smith to Jules Dupuit is given by 
willingness to pay. Malthus, for example, stated in his Principles that “demand will be 
represented and measured by the sacrifice in money which the demanders are willing and able 
to make in order to satisfy their wants” ([1820] 1836, 62). In his memoirs on utility, Dupuit 
(1844, 1849), while refining an intuition of J.B. Say, emphasized that use-value is given by 
maximum willingness to pay, namely by what we call today the reservation price. J.S. Mill 
reached the same conclusion but put it in a more technical way: “Value in use […] is the 
extreme limit of value in exchange”, that is, price ([1848] 1909), bk. 3, ch. 1, § 2). Or: “the utility 
of a thing in the estimation of the purchaser, is the extreme limit of its exchange value” (bk. 3, 
ch. 2, § 1). Given the reservation price as a primitive concept, an individual’s demand is very 
simple: by definition, one is willing to buy a good if one attaches to it a higher value than the 
price at which it can be acquired. Market demand is the distribution function of the demanders’ 
reservation prices. Symmetrically, market supply is the distribution of the suppliers’ reservation 
prices or costs. Experimental supply and demand functions are exactly of this nature. (Inoua 
and Smith, 2019; Smith and Inoua, 2019)                              
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The demand side of this probabilistic view is particularly explicit in the works of the often 
neglected French contributors to the classical school4, starting from Germain Garnier, who 
translated into French the Wealth of Nations which inspired his Abrégé élémentaire des 
Principes de  l’économie politique ([1796] 1846). In the second edition of this book (1846, 195-
196), Garnier derived the law of demand from the distribution of willingness to pay, expressed 
as a fraction of wealth, which distribution he represented as a pyramid. Thus Garnier, following 
the classicalists, did not make the neoclassical error of treating consumption as an expenditure 
out of income. He and the classicalists understood the elementary proposition that a change in 
wealth is a consequence of spending, or not spending, out of total resources.  Income, as 
change in wealth, is to be determined along with consumption by market actions.5 The 
neoclassical fixation on utility maximization subject to a binding income constraint was the 
thought process that defined a static economy. For if the constraint is wealth, then the theory 
could not avoid actions causing change over time, unless wealth was also static, leaving theory 
                                    
4 This French tradition on demand, and value more generally, is thoroughly covered in Ekelund Jr and Hébert 
(1999), not as a part of the classical school, but as an anticipation or even the origin of the marginal-utility view on 
demand.  
5 The constraint language drifted into a “budget” constraint, but if you consume less than your budget, you are 
saving, and adding to wealth. Non-satiation assured that the budget was binding; again, an error for it afforded no 
value to saving. Hence, a static model minimally requires actors to have a willingness to pay for saving, whereupon 
not consuming is an active part of the opportunity set in the current period. In this way, the consumer choice 
problem is separated from its future, and left open to alternative ways of modeling why people save.    
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without a means of understanding the market foundation of “the wealth of nations,” yielding a 
complete negation of its classical purpose! In this sense, neoclassical economics was 
incoherent.  
J.B. Say and Jules Dupuit also adopted explicitly this traditional view on demand (Say [1803] 
2006), vol. II, bk. II, ch. 1; ([1828] 2010), vol. I, part III, ch. 4; Dupuit, 1844, 1849). Cournot’s 
([1838] 1897) treatment of demand also comes down to this view. Cournot, however, emerges 
as a pivotal figure in the transition from classical to neoclassical economics: his view on the 
source of demand is rigorously classical, though he went on to inspire much of the neoclassical 
theory of supply (Smith and Inoua, 2019). In a fascinating paragraph of his Researches ([1838] 
1897), 49-50), he observed that market demand can be assumed to be a smoothly decreasing 
function of price (by the law of large numbers), even though individual demand is realistically 
discontinuous.6  
                                    
6 Significantly for our “lost and found” thesis, Cournot was the first to write the collection of individual reservation 
prices as a demand function, D = f (p). The classical economists, focused on the roots of action, and described the 
market process in terms of the experience of buyers and sellers who compare public prices with their reservation 
values and respond in bargaining. For that discovery process to play out, no one in a market needs to know that an 
economist/statistician can write D = f(p) as a representation of all market reservation prices. However, Cournot 
was doing theory, and the focus was on outcomes only; and he needed to arry the reservation prices from high to 
low, so that, given the sum of seller offers of quantity, he could single out a common theoretical price that 
“cleared the market.” Thus, did he launch the neoclassical methodological break with classical economics, a 
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Thus, the law of demand is originally understood as a regularity holding on the aggregate of 
demanders; not as a direct property of individual demand behavior. This old view has been 
rediscovered in a more abstract version by a few mathematical economists, who, in response to 
the SMD problem, started to derive the law of demand by aggregation over the distribution of 
income or preferences (Hildenbrand, 1983; Grandmont, 1987).                                                                     
 
The Classical View on the Market Mechanism  
All the classical economists followed Adam Smith’s explanation of the price mechanism in 
Chapter 7 of Book 1 of the Wealth of Nations ([1776] 1904), which, and this is crucial, is a 
unified theory of price, as opposed to the neoclassical proliferation of price theories based on 
the number of sellers in a market (monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly, …, “perfect competition”). 
These stem from the innovation of Cournot that various market experiments call into question 
(Smith and Williams, 1990), as does new theory inspired by experiments (Anufriev, et al. 2011).7                                             
                                    
tradition that carries down to today, and that left behind the idea of endogenous price discovery by collective 
interaction, and, with it, the invisible hand metaphor. 
7 Rather than objects of stand-alone modelling, monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly are market outcomes, logically 
inseparable from the buyer-seller contestable context from which they arise. Monopoly is ubiquitous as an 
adaptive consequence of local or national demand being insufficient to support more than a single enterprise, a 
naturally occurring outcome in classical theory. Every new product births as a monopoly, most die, for some many 
entrants follow, for a few there is attrition toward dominance by from 1-4 firms.   
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Price, in the classical view, evolves through the competition of buyers and sellers in a way that 
is familiar but incompatible with “price taking” or the “law” of one price. If the amount brought 
to market is below what buyers are willing to take at the supply price, then a competition starts 
on the demand side. Some buyers are willing to pay a higher price, and the market price rises as 
these buyers outbid one another: price may continue to increase “more or less above the 
natural price (seller cost), according as either the greatness of the deficiency,  or…the eagerness 
of the competition” ([1776], 1904, Vol. 2, 58). If the quantity brought to market exceeds what 
buyers are willing to buy at the supply price, sellers are willing to accept a lower price. As they 
undersell one another, the market price “will sink more or less below the natural price (seller 
cost), according as the greatness of the excess” stimulates seller competition, or how important 
it is that they “get immediately rid of the commodity.” ([1776] 1904, Vol 2., 59) Simple as it may 
look at first sight, this old theory of the price mechanism is in fact a deep and rigorous one. 
Moreover, from where the classical economists left it, we need only a few more steps of 
reasoning to reach a general characterization of the market mechanism, and to pin it down to a 
fundamental principle.                                                                                                                                                                                                        
  
The Essence of the Classical Market Mechanism                                          
The fundamental function of a market, is informational, as Hayek famously emphasized (1937, 
1945). The market mechanism, in essence, consists of revealing in the best possible way the 
market participants’ valuations of a good. If we dig deeper into the classical competitive 
process, we see that the market price, through competition, evolves to reveal better and better 
the individual valuations of the good. This can be  understood intuitively as follows: a buyer, by 
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outbidding rival buyers, brings the market price closer to his/her valuation of the good, though 
the intention was contrary, to buy the cheapest possible. Symmetrically, by underselling rival 
producers, a firm is bringing the market price closer to its cost of production, while its intention 
was on the contrary to sell dearest. Each entity faces discipline by the opportunity-cost terms of 
others. Thus, the market exhibits a collective rationality that is no part of the intentions of the 
individual participants.            
Formally, it follows that the overall distance between the market price and the individual 
valuations (which is simply an integral of excess supply) is minimized—an unintended 
consequence of the competition of buyers and sellers (Inoua and Smith (2019). This, be it 
insisted, is an emergent optimization of the market considered as a whole, since none of the 
individual participants has either the sophistication nor the whole information needed, nor 
even any direct interest in this collective value revelation.8 In the jargon of statisticians, we 
would say that the market participants are unthinkingly engaged in identifying a sophisticated 
robust statistic: the market price converges to what we call the center of value, which 
generalizes the traditional notion of competitive equilibrium (or market clearing) and which 
mathematicians call generically a Fréchet median. Interestingly, this characterization of the 
market mechanism has been suggested from the start in experimental economics, but under 
                                    
8 Comparisons with and without complete information demonstrate that individuals have no effective means of 
utilizing revealed complete information; complete information is neither necessary nor sufficient for equilibrium 
convergence (Smith, 1982, proposition 6) 
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the name of the “excess rent hypothesis” and interpreted as the minimization of the potential 
cost (or “virtual rent”) that it would take to bring about a competitive equilibrium (Smith, 1962, 
126-132). Here we correct and fulfill that fledgling struggle, referring to it as The Principle of 
Maximum Information (PMI).                              
The principle strictly applies only to non-durable goods and services markets without re-trade, 
and therefore non-speculative markets. The information maximally reflected in the market 
price is the consumers’ use-values (weighted by the demands) and the producers’ costs 
(weighted by the supplies). Otherwise, we can have a conflict between use-value, and resale 
value. In a financial market of investors solely motivated by fundamentals, the information 
maximally reflected in price is the investors’ estimations of the asset’s intrinsic value; so, 
provided that investors’ errors are not strongly correlated, the market price converges to the 
intrinsic value of the asset, in a way that is robust to outliers. Thus, does the PMI offer a natural 
foundation for the narrowly specified “efficient market hypothesis.”                    
In a speculative market (for a re-tradable durable good or for a financial asset), however, the 
relevant information are the traders’ expectations of future price changes. In practice, expected 
prices are extrapolative (for example, based on past price changes that are trend-following), 
thus creating a destabilizing feedback loop9 and a bubble that can keep on growing as long as it 
                                    
9 This view echoes the complex-systems (agent-based) approach to financial markets, which treats the extreme 
(i.e. non-Gaussian, power-law) randomness of financial prices as an endogenous dynamics of financial markets 
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is backed by some source of liquidity, such as bank credit. The dichotomy between perishable 
and re-tradable goods and its relevance for macroeconomics have also been established 
experimentally (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, 1988; Porter and Smith, 1994, 2003; Dickhaut, 
Lin, Porter, and Smith, 2012; Palan, 2013; Gjerstad and Smith, 2014; Gjerstad, Porter, Smith, 
and Winn, 2015; Smith and Inoua (2019). This explanation of economic crises and depressions 
as debt-fueled speculative bubbles coming to an end also goes back to the classical economists. 
Thus did Adam Smith famously explain the South Sea Company Bubble ([1776] 1904, Vol 2., 
233), and also did J. B. Say in his important but usually overlooked Cours complet ([1828] 2010, 
part III, ch. XIX) and J. S. Mill ([1848] 1909), bk. III, ch. XII) explain more systematically economic 
crises. 10                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Adam Smith on Beneficence and Justice: Significance for Wealth of Nations 
Adam Smith’s ([1759] 1976) first book was generally ignored, if not trivialized, by twentieth 
century economists (Smith and Wilson, 2019, 2-4). A consequence is that his contributions to 
social exchange theory are usually not part of how we think about Smith’s widely acclaimed 
                                    
(Bouchaud, 2011). One can also show that the extreme (power-law) fluctuations of financial prices follow 
generically by definition of speculation and extrapolative (trend-following) expectations (Inoua, 2016a, 2016b).                                  
10 The classical view on economic instability is also rediscovered in a more sophisticated version notably by Irving 
Fisher, Minsky, and Kindleberger (I. Fisher, 1933; Minsky, 1992; Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011; Keen, 2013).        
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contributions to economics, nor can we appreciate the scope of his deep insights into the 
meaning and interpretation of his observations of the social world around him.  
For Smith the two great pillars of society are beneficence and justice. Beneficence refers to a 
pattern of conduct wherein intentional acts of kindness toward others invoke an urge to reward 
the actor because of the feelings of gratitude the action excites in others (Smith ([1759] 1976), 
78-9). It is because such actions are most likely to be directed to those who have been 
beneficent toward us, that it follows that kindness begets kindness. Thus, Smith derives 
reciprocity norms from its roots in beneficence ([1759] 1976, 225).   
Beneficence is the foundation for reciprocal social exchange, which is self-enforcing in 
permanent communities where there is always a tomorrow to support the return of good 
offices for those conveyed yesterday. The implications for Smith’s Wealth of Nations are that 
beneficence supports trade wherein the reciprocal benefit-reward calculus occurs 
simultaneously in trading partners and accounts for “the propensity to truck, barter and 
exchange one thing for another” ([1776] 1904, 15). Moreover, dependence on mutual trust and 
trustworthiness is reduced if there are mechanisms for third party enforcement of contracts, 
allowing the benefits of reciprocity to extend to strangers.  
Such mechanisms are contained in the obverse of beneficence, Smith’s second pillar of society. 
Justice refers to a pattern of conduct in which intentionally hurtful actions toward others 
provoke punishment in response because of the resentment the action excites in others ([1759] 
1976, 78-9). Between the social forces of beneficence and justice, however, “we feel ourselves 
to be under a stricter obligation to act according to justice, than agreeably to friendship, charity 
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or generosity…” In this, we feel supported “with the utmost propriety, and the approbation of 
all mankind…” ([1759] 1976, 80) 
Why, since Smith’s proposition is concerned with our resentful response to hurtful actions of 
injustice, does he call it “justice?”  Because for Smith, justice is defined negatively—the absence 
of injustice. A world of justice is one that has enumerated specifically prohibited actions, 
assigned appropriate punishments—neither too large or too small, but fit for the infraction—
and then allows the infinitely large set of remaining actions to be pursued freely without 
external constraint.11 Thus, death excites the greatest resentment, and murder is the greatest 
crime. To lose our possessions is a greater evil than to be disappointed only in our expectations 
of gain. This is why breach of property—theft and robbery—that take that which we are 
possessed of, constitute greater crimes than violation of contract12 ([1759] 1976, 84). Civil 
governments that incorporate and follow the “rule of law” simply codify these norms as ‘shalt 
nots’ of justice based on cultural evolutionary experience.    
                                    
11 Justice as liberating in this sense is contained in famous passages in Smith ([1776] 1904, 168, 184) but the 
foundation is in the cited pages in his first book.  
12  The greater penalty for breach of property than of contract originates in our experience of loss, which is much 
more intense than our experience of gain; Smith derives this proposition from a more fundamental psychological 
asymmetry between our joy and our sorrow. “We suffer more…when we fall from a better to a worse situation, 
than we ever enjoy when we rise from a worse to a better. Security, therefore, is the first and the principal object 
of prudence.” ([1759] 1976, 213 and 45)   
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Thus, Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments develops the property right foundations necessary 
for the Wealth of Nations to which he adds the sufficient condition—his axiom of discovery—
the “propensity to truck barter and exchange” ([1776] 1905, 15). However, the latter originates 
in beneficence, reciprocal social exchange, and is supported, within the civil order of 
government, by justice in the form of third party enforcement of contracts as well as its 
enforcement of property. 
Adam Smith’s two works combine to form a comprehensive unified examination of the nature 
and causes of human betterment embedded in our propensity for social and economic 
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